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Ashley Fawver1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
My ultimate objective in writing this commentary is to offer addi-
tional support to Professor Ann Lipton’s thesis that mutual fund manag-
ers voting proxies as a family creates a conflict of interest among the in-
dividual mutual funds, which violates the mutual fund manager’s (“fund 
manager”) fiduciary duty to each individual fund.2  This commentary of-
fers additional support by exploring the idea that the market may not be 
allocating resources optimally due to investors being unaware that fund 
managers’ centralized voting is contrary to the investors’ benefit.  Fur-
thermore, this commentary examines whether the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC”) should mandate disclosure of a fund man-
ager’s research on proxy voting to investors (“research”).  Accordingly, 
the following two key questions arise: (1) Whether there is a benefit in 
fund managers disclosing to retail investors a simplified version of the 
fund manager’s research on proxy voting, along with the current manda-
tory disclosures the SEC already requires; and (2) Whether disclosure of 
the research would cure the capital allocation deficiencies related to the 
conflict of interest mutual fund family voting creates. 
Part II of this commentary analyzes the market efficiency argu-
ment, i.e., that fund managers will cast proxies to each mutual funds’ 
benefit, otherwise investors will choose to allocate their resources in a 
different manner.  Part III of this commentary examines factors other 
than the fund managers’ research that may drive fund managers to vote a 
                                                            
1 Juris Doctor Candidate, Class of 2018 at the University of Tennessee College of Law.   
2 See Ann M. Lipton, Family Loyalty: Mutual Fund Voting and Fiduciary Obligation, 19 
TENN. J. BUS. L. 175 (2017).  
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specific way, which would render disclosure of the proxy voting research 
pointless.  
II. THERE IS A BENEFIT IN PROVIDING INVESTORS WITH PROXY 
VOTING RESEARCH 
As explained more fully herein, investors would most likely bene-
fit from disclosures of the research fund managers conduct to determine 
how to vote proxies.  Under current disclosure requirements, retail inves-
tors are not entitled to fund managers’ proxy voting research.3  However, 
disclosure of a fund manager’s proxy voting research could serve as a 
signal to investors that the fund manager is voting for the individual mu-
tual fund’s benefit.  Furthermore, due to the hardship of switching mu-
tual funds, investors would most likely benefit from disclosure of this 
research before investing in a mutual fund.  
A. Market Efficiency and Information Asymmetries 
Financial professionals promote the theory that an efficient mar-
ket will allocate resources to different mutual funds if the conflict of in-
terest caused by centralized voting causes the fund to underperform.4  
The theory is that investors can either choose to invest in a different 
fund to begin with, or an investor can choose to exit their current un-
derperforming fund.  Thus, financial professionals argue that mutual 
fund managers have good business incentives to manage conflicts of in-
terest so to attract and retain business.  
  
                                                            
3 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(c)(2)(iv) (2016). 
4 Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the 
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059, 1076 (1990).  
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However, for this market theory to work, investors must be in-
formed.  A key assumption in this theory is that all retail investors have 
the same information about the mutual fund as the fund manager.  When 
this assumption fails, the failure leads to market information asymme-
tries.5  When there is asymmetric information “prices are distorted and 
do not achieve optimality in the allocation of resources.”6  Thus, when 
investors are uninformed, resources are not allocated optimally.7  
B. Current Proxy Voting Required Disclosures 
Currently, the SEC mandates disclosure with respect to proxy 
voting for mutual funds through the Investment Company Act of 1940.8  
The SEC requires mutual funds to file a report known as Form N-PX, 
which contains the mutual fund’s complete proxy voting record for the 
past twelve months.9  The Form N-PX discloses to the public whether 
the matter was proposed by management or a shareholder, whether the 
mutual fund voted on the matter, and, if so, how the mutual fund vot-
ed.10   
Additionally, Rule 206(4)-6 requires mutual funds to adopt and 
disclose broad voting policies and procedures that are “reasonably de-
signed to ensure that the adviser votes proxies in the best interest of cli-
ents.”11  While the broad policies and procedures do address general sit-
                                                            
5 Quy-Toan Do, Asymmetric Information, in THE SOCIAL SCIENCE ENCYCLOPEDIA (Adam 
Kuper et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEC/Resources 
/84797-1114437274304/Asymmetric_Info_Sep2003.pdf.  
6 Id.  
7 Id. 
8 LOIS YUROW ET AL., MUTUAL FUND REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK §§ 
12:2, 27:2 (2017). 
9 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (2003). 
10 Id.  
11 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Man-
agement Investment Companies, SEC Release No. IC-25922 (Jan. 31, 2003) (available 
at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm#P40_4561) [hereinafter Disclosure of 
Proxy Voting Policies & Records]. 
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uations, the SEC does not require disclosure specific to each matter vot-
ed on.12 
The SEC also requires mutual fund advisers to retain a copy of 
any document that was material in the adviser’s decision-making process 
to voting proxies.13  However, these documents are not disclosed to in-
vestors.14 
C. Nondisclosure of Mutual Fund Proxy Voting Research Puts Investors at an 
Informational Disadvantage 
Noticeably missing from the SEC required disclosures are the re-
search a fund manager conducts in connection to proxy votes and the 
material documents that the fund manager relied upon when determining 
how to vote the proxies.  While investors have access to the mutual 
funds policies and procedures and actual voting record, there are no 
documents disclosed that connects the two or evidences the fact that the 
proxy vote was in fact for the benefit of the mutual fund.15  
As a result, investors are potentially unaware that fund managers 
vote proxies contrary to the mutual fund’s benefit by voting proxies as a 
fund family.  Without access to this information, investors invest in mu-
tual funds without taking that breach of fiduciary duty into consideration 
when determining a fair price for investing in the mutual fund.  Thus, 
investors are at an informational disadvantage when picking a mutual 
fund to invest in, which could distort prices and result in the market not 
achieving optimality in the allocation of capital.16  
D. Disclosure of Mutual Fund Proxy Voting Research Would Signal to Inves-
tors the Quality of the Mutual Fund 
As things currently stand, investors are not privy to the research 
driving a fund manager’s proxy voting decisions. Access to the simplified 
                                                            
12 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2(c)(2)(iv) (2016). 
13 Id.  
14 Id. 
15 Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies & Records, supra note 11. 
16 DO, supra note 5. 
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research would serve one main purpose. Investors would have the op-
portunity to determine whether the mutual fund manager was in fact vot-
ing for its benefit. This would enable the market to allocate resources 
more efficiently because investors would be able to make an informed 
decision before investing in a mutual fund that was potentially breaching 
its fiduciary duty.   
More specifically, disclosure of the proxy voting research would 
act as a signal. 17 Fund managers can signal the lack of conflict of interest 
and thus the quality of the mutual fund by offering research to verify the 
fund manager’s proxy voting is in the best interest of each individual 
fund. Even if the proxy voting research shows that the proxy vote was 
not in the best interest of each individual fund, fund managers can 
demonstrate that the centralized voting benefits all mutual funds individ-
ually by keeping the management fees low.18  Accordingly, investors 
could make the informed choice to opt in to the mutual fund once fund 
managers demonstrate that the costs of researching and voting for each 
fund individually would dramatically raise management cost.  
E. Investors Would Benefit Most from Disclosure Prior to Investing in a  
Mutual Fund 
Because investors have a difficult time exiting and/or switching 
mutual funds, fund managers should disclose research to investors prior 
to an investor investing in a mutual fund. Along with the reasons Profes-
sor Lipton’s essay states, there are government and self-regulatory organ-
ization rules and regulations that make an investor’s task of switching 
mutual funds difficult.19 Therefore, if the SEC actually considers mandat-
ing this type of disclosure, investors would benefit most if fund manag-
                                                            
17 Signaling is an activity that sellers engage in to inform buyers of the quality of the 
seller’s product. Michael Spence, Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction, 
90 Q. J. ECON. 591, 591–92 (1976).    
18 In a mutual fund, investors are interested in keeping costs low because investors re-
tain all returns not expended to fund managers. John P. Freeman, The Mutual Fund Dis-
tribution Expense Mess, 32 J. CORP. L. 739, 749 (2007).  
19 See Lipton, supra note 2. 
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ers were to make past proxy voting research available prior to investors 
investing in its fund.  
Specifically, rules regulating intermediaries like broker-dealers in-
centivize a broker-dealer not to recommend an investor switch mutual 
funds. Currently, a large number of intermediaries sell shares to inves-
tors.  Likewise, investors depend on intermediaries to make recommen-
dations and to actually buy shares.  If broker-dealers were informed of a 
fund manager’s breach of fiduciary duty, it is unclear whether a broker-
dealer would recommend to an investor to exit a mutual fund in order to 
enter another.  This is so because broker-dealers are subject to strict suit-
ability rules.20  Mutual fund switching is a practice regulators generally 
think to be unsuitable which subjects broker-dealers to higher scrutiny 
and forces them to defend their recommendations to regulators.21  For 
this reason, there is incentive for a broker-dealer to not to recommend a 
mutual fund switch.   
As explained more fully herein, investors would most likely bene-
fit by a fund manager disclosing its research on proxy voting.  Because 
retail investors are not currently entitled to any fund manager’s proxy 
voting research, investors—at the time of investing in a mutual fund—
are unaware of whether fund managers are voting proxies for the mutual 
fund’s benefit. In the interest of signaling the quality of the mutual fund, 
fund managers can disclose this research to investors in an effort to en-
sure optimality in resource allocation.   
III. FACTORS OTHER THAN PROXY VOTING RESEARCH DRIVES 
MUTUAL FUND VOTING 
While there would most likely be a benefit in fund managers dis-
closing proxy voting research as a signaling device, the disclosure may 
not ensure the optimization of resource allocation. Studies evidence the 
fact that other factors drive fund managers to vote proxies a specific 
way, which could make disclosure of the fund managers’ research on 
                                                            
20 FINRA Rule 2111 (2014).  
21 See In re Charles E. Marland & Co., 45 S.E.C. 632, 636, 1974 SEC LEXIS 2458, at 8–
16 (1974) (explaining that recommending mutual fund-switching creates a rebuttable 
presumption of unsuitability).   
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proxy voting irrelevant. Thus, it is likely that fund managers providing 
research to investors would not fix any capital allocation discrepancies in 
the market related to the lack of research available to investors on fund 
managers’ proxy voting.  
Specifically, a recent study shows that fund managers are more 
inclined to vote in favor of management-sponsored proposals in locally 
headquartered companies.22 The results of the study suggest that “social 
networks and interactions between firm executives and fund managers 
impact the latter’s proxy voting decisions.”23 That is, “[i]f mutual fund 
managers enjoy good relationships with the management of the firms in 
their portfolios, they are more likely to vote favorably in proposals spon-
sored by the management” without regard to the any research per-
formed.24  
Another study shows that business ties between a mutual fund 
and a portfolio corporation influences funding.25 For example, there are 
situations where a fund manager also manages the retirement plan assets 
of a portfolio company.26  In this case, the fund manager is incentivized 
to support management recommendations to further its own business 
interests (i.e., gain and/or retain business from the portfolio corporation) 
rather than voting to maximize the wealth of the mutual fund investors.27  
Thus, “the more business ties a fund company has, the less likely it is to 
vote in favor of shareholder proposals that are opposed by manage-
                                                            
22 Praveen K. Das, Geographical Proximity and Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting Behavior, 32 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 425 (2011).  
23 Id. at 426.   
24 Id.  
25 Dragana Cvijanovic, Amil Dasgupta, & Konstantinos Zachariadis, Ties That Bind: How 
Business Connections Affect Mutual Fund Activism, 71 J. FIN. 2933, 2934 (2016). 
26 Id.  
27 Id.   
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ment.”28 Regardless of the research, “[b]usiness ties affect the overall 
voting practices at the fund family level.”29   
Other studies show “the presence of peer effects in mutual fund 
voting.”30 Specifically, fund managers demonstrate herd like behavior 
when it comes to proxy voting.31 A fund manager “is more likely to op-
pose management when other funds are more likely to oppose it as 
well.”32 Likewise, “fund managers are more likely to vote ‘for’ when their 
expectations about the number of ‘for’ votes cast by other funds are 
higher.”33  
These studies demonstrate that factors other than the fund man-
ager’s research on proxy voting drive the proxy voting process. Thus, 
disclosure of a fund manager’s research would not necessarily cure all 
capital allocation discrepancies. While the point of disclosure is to assist 
an investor in comparing one mutual fund with another mutual fund to 
make an informed decision, disclosing research to investors on proxy 
voting may be ineffective if factors other than the research are driving 
proxy voting. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The ultimate objective in writing this commentary is to offer ad-
ditional support for Professor Lipton’s thesis by exploring the idea that 
the market may not be allocating resources optimally due to investors 
being unaware that fund managers’ centralized voting is contrary to the 
investors’ benefit. Furthermore, this commentary examines whether the 
SEC should mandate disclosure of a fund manager’s research on proxy 
voting to investors in order to cure any capital allocation deficiencies. 
                                                            
28 Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 85 J. 
FIN. ECON. 552, 569 (2007).  
29 Id.  
30 Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Heterogeneity and Peer Effects in Mutual Fund Proxy 
Voting, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 90, 91 (2010). 
31 Id.  
32 Id.   
33 Id. at 92.  
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Accordingly, this commentary concludes that while disclosure of the 
fund manager’s research can serve as a signal to assist investors in com-
paring the fund with other funds, disclosing research to investors on 
proxy voting may be ineffective in ensuring optimization in the alloca-
tion of resources if factors other than the proxy voting research are driv-
ing fund managers’ proxy voting.  Thus, additional disclosure may not 
add any benefit to the investors’ decision and instead serve as an added 
cost to investors.  
 
